‘Fair Shake of the Sauce Bottle’: Reform Options for Making ASIO Security Assessments of Refugees Fairer

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ABSTRACT

The security assessment of refugees by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) has frequently involved the virtual elimination of procedural fairness and resulted in indefinite detention. Around 54 refugees who arrived since 2009 remained detained by late 2012 after receiving adverse security assessments. Most of them did not receive reasons or evidence, or a summary of reasons or evidence. At most, some were notified of limited matters during interviews by ASIO, but some were not interviewed at all. Binding merits review is entirely unavailable, and the effectiveness of judicial review is severely limited by the difficulty of commencing proceedings in the absence of evidence, by the statutory and common law diminution of procedural fairness, and by the availability of public interest immunity to prevent disclosure of relevant evidence. The High Court decision of M47 in October 2012 did not affect the possibility of marginal procedural fairness or indefinite detention. The creation in October 2012 of an Independent Reviewer of ASIO assessments somewhat improves the fairness of the process but it remains deficient in key respects, not least because the reviewer possesses only powers of recommendation and the new procedure remains insufficiently fair. This article proposes more comprehensive reforms to provide a genuinely fair hearing while protecting security, addressing issues of notice, reasons, the degree of disclosure, merits review, a special advocate procedure, periodic review, and alternative security measures to detention. It also advances a more ambitious proposal to transfer the power to issue security assessments from ASIO to the courts.

A. INTRODUCTION

The issuing of adverse security assessments by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) often denies basic procedural fairness to those who are not Australian citizens, permanent residents or special purpose visa holders. Over the years the problem has been exposed by cases in the federal courts,1 the Australian Law Reform Commission (calling for an inquiry in 2004),2 and academics.3

From 2009 to the present, the problem has been felt most acutely by 54 irregularly arrived refugees who were refused protection visas after receiving adverse security assessments, and found themselves in indefinite detention. Their situation has been highlighted by the Australian Human Rights Commission, complaints to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, a Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention Network, a UNHCR expert roundtable, and two High Court challenges.4 The Australian Labor Party

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conference in 2011 suggested referring an inquiry to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, but that had not occurred by late 2012.

This article briefly describes how the current legal regime under the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth) (‘ASIO Act’) and Migration Act 1958 (Cth) combine to produce procedural unfairness and indefinite detention in refugee cases. The article then focuses on options for reforming the current law to make it fairer. To date, little attention has been given to how the current law could be reformed to provide affected persons with a fair hearing and relief from indefinite detention while ensuring that national security is not compromised. Reform proposals so far have been sporadic, limited in scope, and lacking in detail, and have principally suggested, for instance, extending the merits review jurisdiction of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’), which is insufficient to address the problem.

The question of how to adequately reform the law became even starker after a narrow High Court decision of October 2012, M47 v Director General of Security, which invalidated the regulation under which ASIO made its security assessments. Unlike comprehensive reforms proposed by a Green’s bill in October 2012, the government’s limited response – appointing a retired federal court judge to review ASIO assessments– still does not establish a sufficiently fair procedure or end indefinite detention. This article accordingly proposes a more comprehensive suite of intersecting reforms which is necessary to provide a fair hearing while protecting national security, addressing issues of notice, reasons, the degree of disclosure, merits review, a special advocate procedure, periodic review, and alternative security measures to detention. It also suggests a more ambitious proposal to transfer the power to issue security assessments from ASIO to the courts.

B. THE PROBLEM

Before a protection visa can be granted, a person must be assessed by ASIO as not being ‘directly or indirectly a risk to security, within the meaning of section 4 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979’. ASIO applies a wide definition of security (on an unclear standard of proof) under section 4, which includes protecting Australia and its people from domestic or external (i) espionage; (ii) sabotage; (iii) politically motivated violence; (iv) promotion of communal violence; (v) attacks on Australia’s defence system; or (vi) acts of foreign interference. The definition also refers to ‘the carrying out of Australia’s responsibilities to any foreign country’ in relation to the forgoing threats, and to ‘the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats’.

In M47 in October 2012, the High Court invalidated the regulation under which ASIO made its security assessments of refugees. The regulation was inconsistent with (by circumventing) the Minister for Immigration’s own statutory powers to exclude refugees who present security risks, which in turn were based on the security provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention (namely, in articles 32 and 33). The Minister’s powers were importantly subject to AAT review and greater accountability to Parliament. In response, the government appeared determined to preserve ASIO’s powers to security assess refugees, most likely by amending the Act. It did not indicate any willingness to instead apply the Minister’s existing security powers under the Act.


5 Under the Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 4, Public Interest Criteria 4002; Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 65(1).
It is well accepted that Australia should be protected from serious foreign security threats, even if a person is technically a refugee. However, the central flaw in the current regime is that adverse security assessments issued to refugees deny basic procedural fairness and go further than is necessary to protect security. Section 36 of the ASIO Act provides that the procedural fairness protections of Part IV of the ASIO Act, including a statement of reasons, and merits review (that is, review of the facts) before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’), do not apply to a person who is not an Australian citizen, permanent resident or special purpose visa holder.

While procedural fairness technically remains available at common law, the full Federal Court confirmed in Leghaei that the content of procedural fairness owed to an affected person can be reduced to ‘nothingness’ where the ASIO Director General determines that nothing can be safely disclosed without prejudicing security.  

At most, a person may be made aware of certain allegations during questioning by ASIO, as was the case on the facts in M47. But not all refugees were interviewed by ASIO, and some of those interviewed were not notified with adequate particularity of the substance of the case against them, so as to enable them to effectively respond. In M47, the High Court did not overturn the Full Federal Court’s finding in Leghaei that procedural fairness could be reduced to ‘nothingness’ in the appropriate case. There is no minimum degree of disclosure that must always be given to an affected person.

After M47, however, in October 2012 the government announced that a new Independent Reviewer, a retired federal court judge, will conduct an ‘advisory’ review of ASIO assessments of refugees. The Reviewer will have access to all material relied on by ASIO to determine whether the assessment is an ‘appropriate outcome’, and will provide her opinion and reasons to the person. While independent review is an improvement, it remains an inadequate form of merits review. Unlike AAT review, the Reviewer’s findings are not binding and only take the form of recommendations to ASIO. While disclosure to a person may be improved in some cases, as discussed further below there remains no minimum content of disclosure in all cases, limiting the effectiveness of the person right to make submissions to the Reviewer.

Judicial review (that is, review for errors of law) of ASIO decisions is technically available but may be practically ineffective. If the refugee does not know the grounds of the assessment, it is very difficult to identify a legal or ‘jurisdictional’ error to legitimately commence proceedings. In addition to the diminution of procedural fairness, public interest immunity may also be invoked to preclude the disclosure of sensitive information to a person and its admission in court, impeding the person’s ability to respond to prejudicial material upon which non-disclosed security sensitive information is based. A person’s lawyers are also typically not given access to the security sensitive information.

The result is that an affected person can find themself in a legal black hole, unable to know the case against them and thus unable to effectively challenge the unknown allegations; enjoying no right at all of merits review; and enjoying only a legal fiction of judicial review.

On receiving adverse assessments, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship refuses to

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6 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), s. 54.
grant the recognised refugees protection visas and administratively detains them ostensibly pending removal from Australia ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’.

The problem then is that as refugees they cannot be safely returned to their home countries of persecution, and no safe third country has agreed to take any – not least because they have been adversely assessed as security risks by Australia. In *Al-Kateb v Godwin*, the High Court confirmed the constitutional validity of indefinite detention, such that most of the 50 refugees in detention have now been there between two and three years since the first arrivals in 2009. In *M47* in October 2012, the High Court avoided reopening *Al Kateb*, though a number of judges incidentally suggested it might be decided differently on these facts. The stress of indefinite detention in sub-optimal conditions compounds the pre-existing stresses of persecution and family separation, producing high levels of mental anxiety and self-harm.

C. ESSENTIAL REFORMS TO SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

The more difficult question is how to improve the current procedures to provide a fair hearing for an affected person without jeopardizing national security. The Australian Government’s view is that giving reasons or providing merits review would risk jeopardizing security, because it may disclose confidential intelligence sources, capabilities and methodologies.

Yet, experience elsewhere (as in Canada, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand) demonstrates that this is simply not inevitably the case, and is suggests just how blunt, extreme and disproportionate is Australia’s procedure. It is possible to pursue modest reforms which make the process fairer and preclude indefinite detention, whilst still meeting national security concerns. Some improvements are possible without legislative amendment, while others require new laws. The final part of this article suggests an even more radical reform proposal which provides stronger judicial protection of fair hearing rights.

1. Adequate notice and reasons must be provided

An affected person is only able to adequately respond to the case against them if they know the essential substance of that case. Currently, at the decision-making stage, ASIO need not disclose anything that it reasonably believes would prejudice national security. Refugees are typically not given formal notice of particular allegations or adverse evidence, and may not be aware of the significance of particular questions or statements put to them during ASIO interviews. No reasons are automatically provided to substantiate an adverse assessment once it has been made, frustrating the ability to seek effective judicial review.

Since the appointment of the Independent Reviewer in October 2012, unclassified written reasons will be provided by ASIO but only where a person seeks independent review and then only to the extent not prejudicing security. It remains conceivable that it in a given case, ASIO may determine that it is not possible to disclose any meaningful reasons to a person.

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10 *Migration Act 1958* (Cth), ss. 196 and 198.
12 Peak bodies that have criticised the adverse mental health consequences of protracted immigration detention include the: Australian Medical Association, Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, Royal Australian College of General Practitioners, Royal Australian College of Physicians, Committee of Presidents of Medical Colleges, Alliance of Health Professionals concerned about the Health of Asylum Seekers and their Children, Australian College of Mental Health Nurses, Australian Psychological Society, and Australian Human Rights Commission.
just as currently may result from the common law procedural fairness test. Refugees may also continue to receive no notice of allegations prior to decisions being made.

The first element of a reformed procedure should accordingly be that, at a minimum, a redacted summary of allegations must always be provided to an affected person, where full disclosure of all of the allegations and evidence (including sources) would prejudice national security. Once an adverse security assessment is made, a second element of a reformed procedure should be that the affected person must be provided with a statement of reasons substantiating the basis of the assessment. Such reasons would confirm the allegations which were earlier notified and found to be substantiated, specify the standard of proof applied, dismiss any unfounded allegations, and deal with any objections raised during the hearing.

Neither providing a notice summarising the allegations nor a statement of reasons requires legislative change. The ASIO Act does not require ASIO to withhold notice or reasons from a person. It provides only that ASIO is not statutorily required to do so. There is thus no legislative impediment to ASIO determining in its operational discretion to provide a person with notice, reasons and supporting evidence, consistent with the usual expectation of procedural fairness at common law.

It would, of course, be preferable to amend the ASIO Act to expressly provide that ASIO is required to give notice and reasons, and to specify its minimum content, to ensure certainty and prevent policy back-sliding by ASIO in future. As discussed below, the required disclosure could be independently determined by the merits tribunal or court on review, according appropriate weight to ASIO’s expert security judgments.

2. The minimum content of disclosure

Notice, disclosure of information and evidence, and reasons can only serve their purpose in enabling a fair hearing if their content is fit for purpose. European practice in security cases is instructive here. In A and others v United Kingdom, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the ‘dramatic impact’ of lengthy and potentially indefinite administrative detention of non-citizen suspected terrorists, not capable of removal, demanded the importation of ‘substantially the same fair trial guarantees’ of a criminal trial into proceedings challenging the lawfulness of detention.15

In particular, such guarantees were found to include a minimum degree of disclosure personally to a detainee, as determined by the relevant court or tribunal. While the protection of classified information may be justified to protect national security, the European Court held that it must be balanced against the requirements of a fair hearing. The starting point is that it is ‘essential that as much information about the allegations and evidence against each applicant was disclosed as was possible without compromising national security or the safety of others’. Where ‘full disclosure’ is not possible, however, a person must still enjoy ‘the possibility effectively to challenge the allegations against him’.

Thus, ‘where all or most of the underlying evidence remained undisclosed’, ‘sufficiently specific’ allegations must be disclosed to the affected person to enable that person to effectively provide his representatives (including security-cleared counsel) ‘with information with which to refute them’. The provision of purely ‘general assertions’ to a person, where the decision made is based ‘solely or to a decisive degree on closed material’ will not satisfy the procedural requirements of a fair hearing.

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15 A and others v United Kingdom, ECHR App. No. 3455/05 (19 February 2009), paras. 217-220.
A third element of a reformed Australian procedure should be that an affected person must be entitled to a minimum, irreducible content of disclosure, sufficient to reasonably inform them of the case against them. Notice and reasons must be as specific and substantiated by evidence as possible, consistent with not unduly prejudicing national security (in contrast to the current standard of any ‘prejudice’ to security). Highly generalised allegations lacking adequate specificity should not be permitted. Where ASIO refuses to disclose an adequate summary of the allegations, ASIO should not be entitled to rely upon the underlying classified information or evidence.

Contrary to the Australian Government’s claim, disclosure of the essential allegations will not necessarily jeopardize national security, because a redacted summary need not disclose sources, informants or intelligence gathering methods. To give an example, at present a refugee receives a letter merely asserting that s/he is risk to security. Yet, it would be perfectly possible for ASIO to include in such letter some basic particulars as to why a person is a security risk – for example: ‘You are considered a security risk because in January 2008 you joined the Tamil Tigers and in September 2008 you killed four civilians in village X in Sri Lanka’. Such reasons do not usually prejudicially disclose methods or sources.

This modified approach better balances the public interest in national security against other important public interests, including the individual right to a fair hearing and ensuring the democratic imperative of the accuracy and accountability of ASIO decisions (which can only be ensured if the information ASIO relies upon is tested and challenged). As a matter of policy, it should be accepted that security interests cannot prevail over all other considerations at the discretion of the security agency alone, which has an inevitable self-interest in maximising security and little interest in balancing competing public interests.

Admittedly there may be rare hard cases where any disclosure would tip off a person to intelligence methods – as where information could only have come from a particular source – and disclosure may not only compromise intelligence methods by endanger an informant. Such cases are the exception not the rule. It may be that requiring minimum disclosure in such cases remains a necessary trade off to ensure fairness, accurate decision-making, and accountability, and ASIO would always have the option of not issuing an adverse assessment to protect its sources, or utilizing other means (such as surveillance) to address the threat.

3. Genuine merits review must be available

As noted earlier, the new Independent Reviewer process is non-binding and insufficient to safeguard the interests of an affected person. The Review’s decision also cannot disclose anything to the person that would prejudice national security, so the person may remain in the dark after their review. The fourth element of a reformed procedure is that, at a minimum, an administrative tribunal should be empowered to independently review the merits of ASIO’s security assessment. The simplest reform would be to extend the jurisdiction of the Security Appeals Division of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, as is already available to Australian citizens, permanent residents and special purpose visa holders under section 54 of the ASIO Act 1979 (Cth).

However, given the serious consequences of an adverse assessment, and the vulnerable position of refugees in detention, it should not be incumbent on affected persons to elect to commence proceedings. Rather, to borrow a Canadian device (albeit in a judicial process), AAT review should be automatic once an assessment is made. A more efficient procedure would be to vest the primary security decision in the AAT, responding to an application from

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16 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2001) (Canada), s. 77(1).
ASIO to issue an adverse assessment. Providing AAT jurisdiction of any kind would require a legislative amendment to the ASIO Act.

Extending AAT jurisdiction alone would not be sufficient to provide a fair hearing. At present, even where the AAT’s security jurisdiction is available (for instance, to citizens), it is still possible that essential information or evidence can be withheld as prejudicial to national security, whether through statutory exceptions to the requirement to give reasons or the operation of ministerial certificates,17 because common law procedural fairness can still be reduced to nothingness, or where public interest immunity precludes the admissibility of relevant security evidence.18 The AAT may not therefore be able to review the merits based on all of the relevant information, or may be reviewing the merits in circumstances where the affected person received inadequate disclosure and cannot effectively defend themselves.

Accordingly, further legislative amendments are required to ensure that once AAT jurisdiction is activated, it provides real and effective merits review. There are a number of ways to achieve this goal. In the first place, the AAT must (by statute) always be given full access to all of the security sensitive information on which ASIO seeks to rely – even that which is not disclosed the affected person and, where necessary, by overriding public interest immunity. It is difficult to see why tribunal members (or federal judges) could not be safely entrusted with information which public servants at ASIO are entitled to handle. Where ASIO refuses to disclose information to the AAT (or to a federal court), ASIO should not be entitled to rely upon such evidence. In addition, a related matter is pertinent to the fairness of merits review and/or judicial review proceedings.

4. A special advocate must be appointed

While the appointment of a ‘special advocate’ has been contemplated in the different context of Australian criminal proceedings,19 they have been neither used nor statutorily required in ASIO security assessments. Where ASIO seeks to rely upon any information not disclosed to the affected person or their lawyers in merits review before the AAT, or in subsequent judicial review proceedings, a (security cleared) ‘special advocate’ should be appointed under statute (based on the UK, Canadian and New Zealand approaches)20 as a fifth component of a reformed Australian process. As in other jurisdictions, the special advocate would be entitled to see all of the information upon which ASIO seeks to rely, and must keep such information in confidence (unless authorised by ASIO, the AAT or a federal court to disclose it).

The overall purpose of the special advocate is to assist the tribunal or the court to review (on the merits and law respectively) the evidence against a person, by independently testing it when the affected person and their lawyers cannot see all of it for security reasons. It is a mechanism for balancing the individual’s fair hearing rights with security concerns.

The special advocate ideally should be empowered to perform three functions: (1) to make submissions on the adequacy of the notice and/or reasons provided to the person; (2) to test ASIO’s claims that information may not be safely disclosed to the person; and (3) to make submissions on the substance of any evidence which cannot safely be disclosed to the person.

17 ASIO Act 1979 (Cth), ss. 37(2) and 38.
20 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canada), s. 85; Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK), s. 6; Immigration Act 2009 (New Zealand), s. 263.
The principal limitation of a special advocate is that s/he cannot communicate confidential information – or even at all – to the affected person, and therefore cannot receive instructions on how to deal with it.\(^{21}\) Also, their appointment assumes that the person’s regular lawyer or barrister cannot be safely entrusted (in confidence) with the evidence, whereas it may be enough to empower a person’s lawyers with the special advocate’s functions – particularly when any breaches of confidence by them could incur criminal penalties.

However, a special advocate might acquire special expertise in repeatedly dealing with security information and intelligence methods and thus be a stronger safeguard than less experienced lawyers. The position is also designed not as the person’s legal representative, but as an independent office at greater arms-length. It might also meet the concerns of intelligence agencies about giving security clearance to too deep a pool of lawyers – even if such concern registers considerable distrust for the professionalism of lawyers.

The Independent Reviewer process of October 2012 gives a retired judge access to all information relied on by ASIO in making an assessment. However, it is less protective than a Special Advocate procedure because it reposes in one inquisitorial person the task of both reviewing the materials and making decisions about them, whereas an Advocate assists a tribunal or court to reach an independent decision in a more typical adversarial context. The process remains imbalanced because no-one with access to all of the information is advocating the cause of the person, and the person remains in the dark about the evidence against them.

5. The adverse security assessment must be periodically reviewed

Currently ASIO has no policy of periodically or automatically reviewing adverse security assessments once made, unless new information comes to light. This is plainly inadequate, because it means that once a person has been found to pose a security risk, in legal terms they remain a security risk for the rest of their lives, unless the assessment is later removed. Such process is excessive and overbroad, and means ASIO is not limiting its assessments only to those who continue to remain a security risk.

From October 2012, the new Independent Reviewer will periodically review adverse assessments every 12 months. The Reviewer will ask ASIO whether any new information has become available, whereupon ASIO itself will also reconsider the assessment. Synchronising periodic reviews in this way helps to ensure that the reviews stay on track and the introduction of reviews is an important improvement in the process that existed to late 2012.

However, the Independent Reviewer’s periodic reviews are also non-binding and the increment of 12 monthly reviews is too long. A legislative amendment should instead require ASIO to automatically and periodically review every six months adverse assessments at least every six months. Australia’s international human rights law obligations require the grounds of detention to be periodically re-assessed.\(^{22}\) ical. Liberty is precious and protracted administrative detention risks undervaluing liberty. Further, any review should not only the basis of the security assessment, but as importantly what measures are necessary to contain any security risks – in particular, whether measures less invasive than detention can be utilized. It would also be preferable for an adverse assessment to automatically lapse after the expired period, so that the onus is on ASIO to remake it (rather than it continuing until


\(^{22}\) A v Australia (UNHRC 560/1993), 3 April 1997, para. 9.4; Shafiq v Australia (UNHRC 1324/2004), 13 November 2006, para. 7.2.
ASIO confirms or withdraws it). This would provide an incentive for reviews not to be delayed and to avoid backlogs of reviews.

D. REFORMING INDEFINITE DETENTION RISKS

As noted earlier those who receive adverse security assessments are indefinitely detained under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) pending removal elsewhere which are not realistically available. For reasons given in the UN complaints mentioned earlier, indefinite detention is inconsistent with Australia’s obligations under article 9 of the ICCPR. The legal solutions are not difficult assuming the political will for reform can be mustered.

First, it cannot be assumed that all persons with adverse security assessments require automatic detention. The nature of the threat posed by a person must be carefully considered and the range of less invasive alternatives considered, so that a proportionate and not excessive means is adopted in responding to the security risk posed. Such is the obligation on Australia under international human rights law; it also makes sense to ensure that scarce public resources are spent on detaining only those who in fact require it.

Second, many of the available means already exist: (a) surveillance by police or security agencies; (b) anti-terrorism control orders; (c) criminal prosecution for terrorist offences or other international crimes under the federal Criminal Code; or (d) release into ‘community’ detention with any number of administrative ‘conditions’ imposed by the Minister of Immigration and Citizenship.23 Such conditions could conceivably include regular reporting to authorities, residing in certain places, restrictions on communication and association, GPS-tracker bracelets and so on. Conditions such as these are preferable to indefinite detention, but entail lesser procedural protections than, for instance, control orders, which entail judicial safeguards not found in the Migration Act regime of administrative community detention.

Third, if persons with adverse security assessments continue to be detained because of the personal risk they pose, stronger safeguards on detention are essential: (a) detention should only continue as long as active, pending removal proceedings with a particular country are actually on foot; (b) there should be a maximum time limit on detention of three (or at most, six) months, beyond which a person must be released absent any exceptional circumstances (such as unforeseen delays in the active removal proceedings); and (c) any renewal of an expired period of detention should be based on a fresh assessment by ASIO that the person remains a security risk and that their detention remains necessary.

Fourth, where it is indeed necessary to detain a person because of the threat they pose, the legal fiction should not be maintained that they are being detained for immigration purposes – that is, pending removal – when removal is not realistic. In comparable democracies, detention pending removal does not meet the requirements of human rights law where there is no imminent reasonable prospect of removal.24 The immigration removal powers have become a proxy for what is in reality administrative security detention.

In principle, there are two legal options where a person cannot be realistically removed and immigration detention is no longer justified. First, the authorities can utilize the various alternative measures already mentioned, from surveillance through to prosecution. Secondly, the Parliament could take the extreme step of legislating for administrative security detention,

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23 Respectively, Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), Schedule 1: Criminal Code, Division 104; Division 101; and Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s. 198AB (a ‘residence determination’).

that is, empowering the authorities to detain people without charge or trial to contain the security risk they pose. In theory, such detention could commence upon an order from a federal court, following an application from ASIO or the Australian Federal Police (not DIAC, which is not an expert security agency).

Legislating for administrative security detention would, however, be a very serious and unjustifiable step at present. After 9/11, the United Kingdom government believed that it was necessary to declare a ‘public emergency’ in order to derogate from (suspend) its obligation under the ICCPR to guarantee freedom from arbitrary detention. Security detention of this kind would only be lawful if Australia faced a public emergency, which is almost certainly not the case at present.

This precisely indicates the importance of liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention under international law, which should not be lightly interfered with – and certainly not as Australia’s current procedures do. It is difficult to see why the alternatives mentioned above are not capable of meeting the threats posed by people with adverse security assessments.

E. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR ‘ROLLS ROYCE’ REFORM

The above proposals are modest in that they essentially preserve the existing institutional structure of the security assessment procedure. Allowing judges or AAT members to confidentially see security information, coupled with the use of a special advocate to independently test it, and minimum disclosure of the essence of the case to the person, would preserve national security interests while giving the person a reasonably fair procedure, and improving the accuracy and accountability of ASIO decisions.

It is, of course, possible to pursue more robust reform of the current procedure, which has an in-built structural flaw which irremediably limits its fairness. Currently ASIO is the agency which both gathers intelligence and uses it to issue adverse security assessments. Few doubt ASIO’s right intentions; and ASIO certainly has special expertise in the area. But the fact remains that ASIO is simultaneously investigator and judge, a structure which by its nature cannot provide independent decision making or avoid conflicts of interest.

Deeper structural reform could potentially improve the quality, accuracy and fairness of decision-making about adverse security assessments, but would require courage from the legislature. A federal court (such as the Federal Magistrates Court) could be statutorily empowered with original jurisdiction to issue adverse security assessments. On this (more protective) model, ASIO would apply to a federal court for the issue of an adverse security assessment, in a fair hearing involving adequate notice, disclosure and reasons, a special advocate, and more calibrated limits on public interest immunity. Federal judges would be given full access to all of the security sensitive information upon which ASIO seeks to rely, or else it would be excluded.

There is no constitutional impediment to this procedure, because it is not proposing merits review in the guise of judicial review, but rather endowing original jurisdiction to determine the facts. There is good precedent for it in the security area. The federal courts can issue civil control orders to prevent terrorism on application from the Australian Federal Police. The High Court upheld that scheme and observed that empowering judges to issue orders brings the safeguard of an independent and impartial judge and judicial procedures.

26 Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33.
For the same reasons, it is good policy to involve the courts in issuing adverse security assessments, rather than continuing to permit ASIO to decide that its own opinion is correct. The consequences of an adverse security assessment are grave – at least as grave as, and often worse than, the restrictions of a control order – and include exclusion from protection as a refugee in Australia, protracted indefinite detention, and potential return to persecution.

Such seriousness of consequences make a judicial process more appropriate, and suggest that executive decision-making is less appropriate. While judges have been somewhat reluctant to intensively review security evidence, there is no impediment to judges readily acquiring expertise – just as they exercise expertise in many other technical areas of the law, from mergers and acquisitions to making predictive orders to prevent terrorism.

The courts would also not be overburdened by the volume of cases – ASIO has issued around 54 adverse assessments out of 7,000 cases since 2010\(^{27}\) – roughly 20 per year. Fewer applications would likely be brought by ASIO before a court, as it would know that its case would need to bear up to independent scrutiny of all relevant facts and evidence by a court. This approach is also preferable to merits review by the AAT because it streamlines a two-step process into one (by eliminating the primary decision by ASIO followed by AAT merits review), thus saving scarce public resources, improving access to justice for affected persons, and improving the integrity and accountability of decisions. That judges are involved should also assuage ASIO’s security concerns about the integrity of the process.

Whether a modest or more ambitious reform agenda is ultimately pursued, it should be noted that the defects of the current regime do not only affect irregular arrivals. In fact, the statutory procedural fairness guarantees accorded to Australian citizens and permanent residents can also be virtually eliminated, by additional statutory means, where national security is at risk.\(^{28}\) The issue is not only a marginal one confined to ‘illegal’ outsiders or refugees, but also goes to the heart of how the Australian government is prepared to treat its people.

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\(^{27}\) ASIO Director General, quoted in Joint Select Committee on Australia’s Immigration Detention Network, above note 4, p. 161.

\(^{28}\) See, eg, *ASIO Act 1979* (Cth), ss. 37(2) and 38.